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A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE FOUNDATIONS OF
QUANTUM THEORY AND AN ANALYSIS OF THE
FRAUCHIGER–RENNER PARADOX
DANIEL V. TAUSK
Abstract. This is a short text covering some topics on the Foundations
of Quantum Theory and it includes some comments on the recent Nature
article [6] by D. Frauchiger and R. Renner. The so-called “paradox” is
simply due to a misunderstanding on the appropriate way to apply the
quantum mechanical rules. The text is meant to be accessible to non
physicists and the math is kept to a minimum (just some Linear Algebra
and extremely elementary Probability Theory).
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FOUNDATIONS OF QUANTUM THEORY 2
1. Introduction
Articles proclaiming some new mind-blowing paradoxical or weird aspect
of Quantum Theory are quite common and also, most often, based on some
degree of misunderstanding1. The article [6] is no exception. My comments
on that article appear in Section 9 of the present text. The preceding sections
are dedicated to an exposition about certain topics on the Foundations of
Quantum Theory. An important topic that is missing from these notes
is the celebrated Bell’s Theorem about which I have extensively written
elsewhere (see [8]). For readers interested in going deeper into the subject
of Foundations of Quantum Theory, I suggest the excellent new book [11]
by T. Norsen and also the excelent new book [5] by J. Bricmont. For a non
technical introduction covering the history of the various characters and
controversies involved in the quest for the meaning of Quantum Theory,
I suggest the very entertaining new book [2] by A. Becker. After writing
these notes, I found out about this nice paper [9] on the arXiv containing an
analysis of the Nature paper [6]. The main conclusions obtained in [9] are
very similar to mine and that article contains also a few more interesting
points that do not appear in my analysis.
Let me start this presentation with a crash course on what you need to
know about Quantum Theory.
2. The basic structure of textbook Quantum Theory
The standard way of presenting Quantum Theory is to consider a split of
the world into a system (which is usually microscopic) and an environment
for that system containing some macroscopic experimental apparatus and
possibly living experimenters. The system is described within the theory by
means of a quantum state (or wave function), which is a unit vector ψ in
a complex vector space H endowed with an inner product2. For simplicity,
I will assume the space H to be finite-dimensional. When the system is
not interacting with its environment, the time evolution of its quantum
state is given by a norm-preserving linear operator, i.e., a unitary operator
U : H → H. So, if the state of the system at time t0 is the unit vector ψ,
then the state of the system at time t1 will be the unit vector Ut0t1(ψ), with
Ut0t1 : H → H the unitary operator that describes the time evolution from
time t0 to time t1.
1An important exception is the celebrated 1964 article by John Stuart Bell [3], which
is the origin of what we now call Bell’s Theorem. That article, taken together with the
later experimental confirmation of certain predictions of Quantum Theory, indeed shows
a completely unexpected and counterintuitive aspect of the universe we live in.
2More precisely, the space H is assumed to be a complex Hilbert space. Also, linearly
dependent nonzero vectors in H correspond to the same quantum state. These details
will be of no importance in this exposition and you can safely ignore the more technical
footnotes if they involve too much math for you.
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Interaction of the system with the environment is normally described in
terms of an outside observer making a measurement on the system (though
the terminology “measurement” turns out to be misleading, as we will see
in Section 3).
In the simplest case3, the formalism for a measurement takes the following
form: let B = {ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψn} be an orthonormal basis of H. A measure-
ment with respect to the basis B is an experiment with n possible outcomes
(one outcome for each basis element), labelled as O1, O2, . . . , On; the out-
come Oj will be obtained with certainty if the quantum state of the system
is ψj and after the experiment is concluded the system remains in the quan-
tum state ψj . More generally, the quantum state will be a unit vector ψ
which can be written uniquely as a linear combination
(1) ψ = a1ψ1 + a2ψ2 + · · · + anψn,
with complex coefficients a1, a2, . . . , an ∈ C. This quantum state is called
a superposition of the basic quantum states ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψn. The condition
that ψ has norm one implies that |a1|2 + |a2|2 + · · · + |an|2 = 1. Thus,
the nonnegative numbers pj = |aj |2 can be interpreted as a probability
distribution on the set {O1, O2, . . . , On} of possible outcomes. According
to the theory, a measurement with respect to the basis B on a system with
quantum state ψ will yield the outcome Oj with probability pj = |aj|2.
After the measurement, the quantum state of the system collapses to ψj ,
if the outcome Oj has been obtained. The measurement thus destroys the
superposition with respect to the basis B.
If we choose to assign a real number rj to the outcome Oj , then we may
define a self-adjoint operator T : H → H by requiring that T (ψj) = rjψj
for all j = 1, . . . , n (i.e., ψj will be an eigenvector of T with eigenvalue rj
and the matrix of T with respect to the basis B will be diagonal). With this
definition of T , one straightforwardly checks that the expected value for the
outcome of the measurement (i.e., the weighted average p1r1 + · · · + pnrn)
is given by the inner product 〈T (ψ), ψ〉. People then call this experiment a
measurement of the observable corresponding to the self-adjoint operator T
or simply a measurement of the observable T .
Most expositions on the subject start with the self-adjoint operator and
then define the probabilities using an orthonormal basis of eigenvectors. I
think, however, that the subject is better understood if we don’t put that
much emphasis on the operator. This is discussed in the next section.
3More generally, one can consider a direct sum decomposition H =
⊕n
j=1
Hj of H into
mutually orthogonal subspaces instead of an orthonormal basis. The outcome Oj will be
obtained for states that belong to the subspace Hj and the decomposition of ψ in (1) is
taken with ψj a unit vector in Hj , so that pj = |aj |
2 is the squared norm of the orthogonal
projection of ψ onto Hj . An even more general mathematical formalism for measurement
involves the concept of a positive operator valued measure, but this is not usually covered
in undergraduate textbooks for physics students.
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3. Do self-adjoint operators correspond to the properties of
a system in Quantum Theory?
No. If all you know about Quantum Theory is what you have learned
from my exposition in Section 2, you might be wondering why would any-
one think that the answer should be “yes”. So, before we see why “no” is the
right answer, let us first see why one would expect the answer to be “yes”.
In practice, a quantum theory (i.e., the theoretical scheme of Section 2, but
with concrete specifications for the unitary evolution operators Ut0t1 and
some specific association of self-adjoint operators to experiments) is con-
structed from a classical theory (such as Newtonian Mechanics or Maxwell’s
Electromagnetism) by a process called quantization. Such process associates
self-adjoint operators to quantities that were physically meaningful in the
classical theory, such as the position of a particle, the total momentum or
energy of a system, the average value of the electric field in a region of
space, and so on. In the quantized theory we then talk about “position
operator”, “momentum operator”, “energy operator”, “electric field opera-
tors”, etc. This association of self-adjoint operators to physically meaningful
quantities of the classical theory induces people to think of these operators
as corresponding to physically meaningful quantities (or properties) of a
system in Quantum Theory. The experiment used to “measure the oper-
ator” is then thought of as a measurement of the corresponding physical
quantity (“position measurement”, “momentum measurement”, etc). One
would then naturally expect that “measuring the momentum of a particle”
means that the particle has a certain amount of momentum and that the
measurement tells me what that amount is.
That expectation turns out to be wrong. First, notice that the outcome
of a measurement of a self-adjoint operator T is not determined by the
quantum state ψ, unless ψ is an eigenvector of T (in general, ψ only allows
you to calculate the probabilities for the various possible outcomes). So,
if it is true that ψ contains all the facts about the system, it follows that
the outcome of a measurement of T is not in general predetermined before
the measurement. The measurement creates the outcome, instead of simply
revealing a preexisting (yet unknown) value. But maybe there are more facts
about the system, not expressible in terms of ψ, so that the outcome of a
measurement of T is determined by ψ and these extra facts? Denoting these
extra facts by λ, we would have then that the outcome of the measurement
is a function v(ψ, λ, T ) of the quantum state ψ, the extra facts λ and the
operator T . But that cannot be right. There are many well-known no-go
theorems4 that show that the existence of such a mapping v (defined for all
self-adjoint operators T or, at least, for a sufficiently large set of self-adjoint
operators T ) contradicts the predictions of Quantum Theory.
4For details, see for instance the section entitled “Bell’s theorem and non-contextual
hidden variables” of [8] and the references therein.
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These no-go theorems have generated a considerable amount of misunder-
standings throughout the history of the field, so a few comments are in order.
First, do these theorems prove that during the measurement of T a truly
random event takes place, generating an outcome that is not determined by
all the facts (known or unknown) that existed before the measurement? You
will certainly find many references telling you that the answer is “yes”, that
“God does play dice” and that if Einstein doesn’t like it, too bad for Ein-
stein. But this is all wrong: it is not an accurate presentation of Einstein’s
views and it turns out that the quantum predictions are compatible with
fully deterministic theories, i.e., theories in which the future is completely
determined by the past. It is not true that Einstein was particularly con-
cerned with determinism. I am also not concerned with determinism and I
have never met anyone working on quantum foundations that is concerned
with determinism. Nevertheless, since it is a common misunderstanding,
let me explain why the no-go theorems do not rule out determinism, de-
spite the initial appearance that in a deterministic theory the outcome of
a measurement of T could be written as a function of the form v(ψ, λ, T ).
Here is the catch: “measurement of T” does not refer simply to one specific
experimental procedure. There are in general many distinct experimental
procedures that work as “measurements of T”. In the deterministic theory,
the outcome will be a function of ψ, λ and the details of the experimental
procedure E that is used to “measure T”. So v(ψ, λ, T ) doesn’t work, but
v(ψ, λ, E) does! The difficulty with v(ψ, λ, T ) is that we can have in general
completely different experimental procedures E1 and E2, both counting as
“measurements of T”, but with v(ψ, λ, E1) 6= v(ψ, λ, E2).
But isn’t it weird anyway that we can’t talk about the momentum and the
energy of a system in Quantum Theory as we used to do in classical physics?
Physicists are very attached to the idea that systems should have momentum
and energy because they have developed strong intuitions reasoning with
these concepts. So, if that’s not real, what is then? The attachment is so
strong that some people report the no-go theorems as proving that a system
in Quantum Theory “has no properties”. Well, not really: it just doesn’t
have the properties you naively expected it to have. Another desperate
reaction to the no-go theorems is to insist that self-adjoint operators really
correspond to properties of a system in Quantum Theory and to “avoid”
the contradictions arisen from this insistence by declaring the reasonings
that lead to such contradictions to be forbidden (the contradictions are still
there, of course, but we choose not to talk about them). That is basically the
road taken in the so called Consistent Histories interpretation of Quantum
Theory5. The insistence that the physically meaningful quantities of the
classical theories must remain meaningful at the fundamental level (in which
the classical theories no longer work) is behind many of the claims that
Quantum Theory is paradoxical and weird.
5See the subsection entitled “Consistent histories” of [8] and the references therein.
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The truth, however, is that the set of physically meaningful quantities is
highly theory-dependent and this should not look strange after a moment
of reflection. Take, for instance, Newtonian Mechanics. It is a theory about
particles with sharply defined trajectories. The existence of such trajec-
tories allow us to talk about positions and velocities. We then define the
momentum of a particle as the product of the mass by the velocity. What if
the correct theory describing affairs at the fundamental level does not have
trajectories? What if what we normally call “fundamental particles” are
not really particles in the ordinary sense, but only appear to behave like
particles in certain situations? If there are no trajectories, then positions
and velocities are not meaningful concepts. Most importantly, even if we
have trajectories (and thus positions and velocities), it does not mean that
the word “momentum” should have any meaning. Sure, one could choose to
define “momentum” as the product of mass by velocity, like in Newtonian
Mechanics. But in a highly non Newtonian dynamics, this “momentum”
defined like that will have none of the familiar properties that momentum
had in Newtonian Mechanics. In particular, experiments that in Newtonian
Mechanics would measure the momentum of a particle might have nothing
to do with this “momentum”. So, that’s just it: Newtonian Mechanics is a
great approximation for the motion of matter at the macroscopic level, but
it is false at the fundamental level. Whatever the details of the theory de-
scribing affairs at the microscopic level turn out to be, it has no obligation to
assign sensible meanings to words like “momentum”, “angular momentum”
or “energy”. At the very least, we know from the no-go theorems that what
we ordinarily call “measurements” of these physical quantities in Quantum
Theory are not really that.
4. Interference
As we saw in Section 2, if a system has a quantum state of the form
ψ = a1ψ1 + · · · + anψn, with B = {ψ1, . . . , ψn} an orthonormal basis of
H, then a measurement with respect to the basis B yields the outcome Oj
corresponding to the basis element ψj with probability pj = |aj |2. After the
measurement, if the outcome Oj has been found, then the quantum state
of the system collapses to ψj . Thus, if one makes a second measurement
(relative to the same basis) right after the first, the outcome will certainly
be Oj . These facts might lead one to speculate that the basic states ψj are
really the only possible states for the system. The probabilities pj could
be merely a reflection of our ignorance about which of the states ψj the
system is in. However, considering measurements with respect to different
orthonormal bases of H, we readily see that this is not right, as we show
below.
Given a self-adjoint operator S : H → H (not necessarily having B as a
basis of eigenvectors), then a measurement of S on a system with quantum
state ψ has 〈S(ψ), ψ〉 as expected value. If “being in the state ψ” really just
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meant “being in the state ψj with probability pj” then the expected value
for a measurement of S would be the weighted average
(2) p1〈S(ψ1), ψ1〉+ · · ·+ pn〈S(ψn), ψn〉
of the expected values of S for the states ψj with weights given by the prob-
abilities pj. However, as one readily calculates, the inner product 〈S(ψ), ψ〉
is given by:
(3) 〈S(ψ), ψ〉 =
n∑
j,k=1
a¯jak〈S(ψj), ψk〉,
where z¯ denotes the conjugate of a complex number z. The terms with j = k
in the sum (3) are precisely the terms appearing in (2). However, we have
also the terms with j 6= k. The expected value 〈S(ψ), ψ〉 is really equal to
the sum of (2) with the terms
(4) a¯jak〈S(ψj), ψk〉+ a¯kaj〈S(ψk), ψj〉 = 2ℜ
(
a¯jak〈S(ψj), ψk〉
)
,
with j < k, where ℜ(z) denotes the real part of the complex number z.
These extra terms are called interference terms. They depend on the state
ψ, the basis B and the operator S. Notice that if ψj is an eigenvector of
S, then the interference term (4) is zero. The interference terms are what
makes “being in the state ψ” observationally different (in a measurement6
of S) from “being in the state ψj with probability pj”.
The effect of interference terms is nicely illustrated by the famous double
slit experiment (google it if you don’t know what it is). When both slits
are open, the electron gets in a superposition of a state ψ1 corresponding to
“passing through the upper slit” with a state ψ2 corresponding to “passing
through the lower slit”. In this scenario, we get an interference pattern in the
detecting screen after the experiment is repeated with many electrons. The
operator S of the above discussion corresponds to the position measurement
at the detecting screen and it has interference terms with respect to the
superposition ψ = 1√
2
(ψ1+ψ2). If we put detectors at the slits to measure the
position of the electron, then we are performing a measurement with respect
to a basis containing ψ1 and ψ2. This measurement yields O1 = “upper slit”
with probability p1 =
∣∣ 1√
2
∣∣2 = 1
2
and O2 = “lower slit” with probability
p2 =
∣∣ 1√
2
∣∣2 = 1
2
. The measurement then collapses the state ψ to ψ1 with
probability 1
2
and to ψ2 with probability
1
2
, destroying the superposition.
We end up with ψ1 for half of the electrons and ψ2 for the other half. Now
6To be more precise, the terms (4) quantify the difference between “being in the state
ψ” and “being in the state ψj with probability pj” when we consider only the expected
value of the measurement of S. If we want to quantify the difference between “being in the
state ψ” and “being in the state ψj with probability pj” for the probability of obtaining
a certain eigenvalue r of S in a measurement of S, then we should replace S in (4) with
the orthogonal projection Pr onto the eigenspace Ker(S − rI) of S corresponding to the
eigenvalue r. Namely, the probability of obtaining the eigenvalue r in a measurement of
S is qual to 〈Pr(ψ), ψ〉 = ‖Pr(ψ)‖
2.
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there are no interference terms and the interference pattern at the detecting
screen disappears.
5. Copenhagen Interpretation
This is usually claimed to be the mainstream “interpretation of Quantum
Theory”. The term, however, does not point to a well-defined set of state-
ments and by asking different people you can get different descriptions of
what they mean by “Copenhagen Interpretation”. Here are some common
positions or attitudes towards Quantum Theory adopted by supporters of
the Copenhagen view:
(i) one should avoid discussing what is happening in a system between
measurements. The microscopic world is wildly counter-intuitive
and/or paradoxical and one should not attempt to form a coherent
picture of what might be happening there.
(ii) Physics is only about predicting experiments. Discussing events that
are not directly observable is meaningless and might even lead to
contradictions.
(iii) Be pragmatic, “shut up and calculate”: we know how to use the
rules of Quantum Theory to predict outcomes of experiments. The
predictions are very successful (they indeed are). There is then no
need for further discussion on Foundations of Quantum Theory7.
(iv) The quantum state of a system provides a complete description of
that system.
Notice that (iv) actually contradicts (i) and (ii), as in (iv) we are talking
about the things that we are not supposed to be talking about according to
(i) and (ii). Though (iv) is normally presented as one of the main tenets of
the Copenhagen Interpretation, I suspect that upon reflection some of its
supporters would rephrase it like this:
(iv’) I don’t know if the quantum state is a complete description of the
reality of the system or if talking about that even makes sense. What
I mean by “complete description” is that using a “more complete
description” will not lead to any sharper predictions for measurement
outcomes and that is all that matters.
6. Moving the split between system and environment.
Measurement problem, Schro¨dinger’s cat and all that.
The standard formulation of Quantum Theory requires one to consider
a split of the world between a system and an environment containing the
observers that make measurements on the system. What if we move that
7This attitude is nicely illustrated by this (highly upvoted) answer on the site Quora:
https://www.quora.com/Does-anyone-understand-quantum-physics-and-its-implications-on-reality/answer/Viktor-T-Toth-1.
Here is my answer to the same question:
https://www.quora.com/Does-anyone-understand-quantum-physics-and-its-implications-on-reality/answer/Daniel-Victor-Tausk.
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split in order to include more things in the system and less in the environ-
ment? For instance, what if we include in the system macroscopic objects,
experimental apparatus, cats, humans or the entire Earth? Such a macro-
scopic system would then be described by means of a quantum state and,
as long as no measurements are performed from the outside on this system,
its quantum state will evolve in time through a linear (unitary) operator.
The problem is that with such a linear evolution, superpositions of quantum
states of microscopic subsystems will evolve into superpositions of quantum
states of macroscopic objects that have performed measurements on those
microscopic subsytems8. We then obtain superpositions of macroscopically
distinct configurations of our big system, such as a superposition of “ap-
paratus registering outcome O1” with “apparatus registering outcome O2”,
superposition of “dead cat” with “living cat”, superposition of “human ex-
perimenter writing down O1 in her notepad” with “human experimenter
writing down O2 in her notepad” and so on.
How are superpositions of macroscopically distinct states of affairs sup-
posed to be understood? If one subscribes to the view that the quantum
state is informationally complete, i.e., that every fact about the system is
expressed in some way as a fact about its quantum state, then if the quan-
tum state contains a superposition of “dead cat” with “living cat”, there can
just be no matter of fact about whether the cat is really alive or dead. This
is the point raised by Schro¨dinger in his famous cat article [12] and it was
used as an argument against the Copenhagen view that quantum states are
informationally complete. Let me put Schro¨dinger’s argument in another
way: while we don’t really know much about how microscopic systems look
like, we normally take for granted that macroscopic systems contain blocks
8Here are the details. First, a word about compositions of systems in Quantum Theory.
If a system S is decomposed into two subsystems S1 and S2, one would normally expect
that the state of the system S will consist of an ordered pair containing the state of S1
and the state of S2. In Quantum Theory, however, states are elements of a vector space
and one is supposed to be able to form new states by taking complex linear combinations
of states. The appropriate mathematical formalism for handling this is the notion of a
tensor product. IfH1 is the complex Hilbert space containing the quantum states of S1 and
H2 is the complex Hilbert space containing the quantum states of S2, then the quantum
states of the composite system S belong to the tensor product H = H1 ⊗ H2. Here’s
what happens when S2 is an experimental apparatus making a measurement on S1 with
respect to an orthonormal basis B = {ψ1, . . . , ψn} of H1. The initial premeasurement
state of S2 will be some unit vector θini of H2. If the composite system S starts in the
state ψj⊗θini then, after the measurement, S will be in the state ψj⊗θj , with θj the state
of S2 representing the fact that S2 have registered the outcome Oj . By linearity of time
evolution, if S1 starts at the superposition ψ =
∑n
j=1
ajψj (so that S starts at ψ ⊗ θini),
then at the end of the experiment the composite system S will be in the superposition∑n
j=1 aj(ψj ⊗ θj). This is a superposition of the states ψj ⊗ θj corresponding to distinct
outcomes being registered by the macroscopic experimental apparatus. Note also that the
state
∑n
j=1 aj(ψj ⊗ θj) is not in general equal to the tensor product of an element of H1
with an element of H2. States of this form are called entangled states. We then say that
the systems S1 and S2 are entangled.
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of matter moving around with well-defined shapes and positions. But a
quantum state for a macroscopic system does not in general define such
shapes and positions and therefore it is not informationally complete.
The problem explained in the previous paragraph became known as the
measurement problem. As it is common in the field of Quantum Founda-
tions, misunderstandings abound. In this case, the main misunderstanding
is about what the problem is.
6.1. The “pragmatic” measurement problem. Suppose you are a very
practical person and all you want from Quantum Theory is to learn how to
use it to make calculations and predict experimental outcomes. How does
the problem of “where I put the split between system and environment”
affects you? In other words, for doing your calculations, when should you
collapse the quantum state of a system? The standard recipe of “collapsing
at a measurement” is somewhat vague. What exactly counts as a mea-
surement? What if you decide to include some macroscopic measurement
apparatus in the system? Will your calculations yield different numbers
then? For calculational purposes, the consequence of collapsing the quan-
tum state too soon amounts to ignoring certain interference terms. So, if you
have some models and theorems showing that in certain situations the inter-
ference terms are going to be zero (or at least very small) then you can sleep
well knowing that your predictions will be correct. This is called the deco-
herence approach to the measurement problem. In practice, detecting any
interference terms in a superposition of macroscopically distinct states of af-
fairs is a huge technological challenge. So, in ordinary laboratory situations,
you can just forget about such interference terms and collapse the quantum
states as soon as any macroscopic experimental apparatus registers the out-
come of the measurement. As your system interacts with the environment,
the linear (unitary) evolution of the quantum state creates superpositions
involving bigger and bigger systems. As this happens, interference terms
get then harder and harder to be detected.
But Schro¨dinger was not really concerned with interference terms. The
decoherence approach does solve a problem, just not the problem that
Schro¨dinger was talking about. In fact, it does not even begin to address
that problem9.
9Confusion on this topic is made worse due to the use of the density matrix formalism.
A density matrix is a positive self-adjoint operator P : H → H with unit trace. Density
matrices are a useful tool for dealing with situations in which we are uncertain about
the quantum state of a system. We then consider a probability distribution on the set
of quantum states and to this probability distribution we can associate a density matrix.
Density matrices can also be used to assign states to systems that are entangled with
other systems. We then have two distinct physical meanings for the same mathematical
object. Confusion between the two meanings makes some people believe that the (true)
measurement problem can be solved using decoherence approaches.
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6.2. The true measurement problem. The argument put forward by
Schro¨dinger is a challenge to the claim that the quantum state is informa-
tionally complete, i.e., that if I give you the quantum state of a system then
you know everything that there is to know about that system. We might
never be able to detect interference terms between a superposition of “dead
cat” and “living cat”, but if it is true that cats are always either dead or
alive, then such superpositions show that there are facts about the cat that
are not determined from the quantum state of a system containing the cat.
In order to handle the true measurement problem, we have to accept one of
the following logical alternatives:
(a) the quantum state is not informationally complete.
(b) The quantum state of an isolated system does not always evolve
linearly, sometimes the quantum state collapses.
(c) The quantum state is informationally complete and it always evolves
linearly in an isolated system. It follows that the macroscopic world
is nothing like we normally think it is. Macroscopic pieces of matter
don’t have well-defined shapes and positions, cats are sometimes
neither dead nor alive, and so on.
Approach (a) is what has been historically called the hidden variables ap-
proach. The name “hidden variables” is normally used as a reference to
any variables appearing in the description of a system besides the quantum
state. This terminology is really bad, since in the most prominent exam-
ple of a hidden variables theory, which is Bohmian Mechanics, the “hidden
variables” are not in any sense hidden. In fact, the “hidden variables” are
simply the positions of the particles in the system. If Bohmian Mechanics
is correct, then whenever you look at anything around you, you are seeing
the “hidden variables”.
Approach (b) is what is called the spontaneous collapse approach. A
prominent example is the GRW (after Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber) sponta-
neous collapse theory. In this theory the quantum state of an isolated system
does not evolve linearly: it only evolves linearly between the spontaneous
collapses10. The law for the spontaneous collapses is precisely formulated in
terms of a stochastic process.
Finally, approach (c) is what became known as the many-worlds inter-
pretation of Quantum Theory. The idea is to interpret the superpositions
between macroscopically distinct states of affairs as distinct states of affairs
happening in parallel “worlds”. There is really no matter of fact about
whether Schro¨dinger’s cat is alive or dead. We have a living cat and a dead
cat existing at the same time. When you look at the cat, you will yourself
duplicate: there will be a copy of you seeing the living cat and a copy of you
seeing the dead cat.
10The theory does not provide any sort of explanation for why the collapses happen.
It just posits a law for the collapses. Physical theories normally just say what the laws
are, they don’t explain why they are like that.
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All these approaches will be discussed in a little more detail in the next
Section.
7. Quantum Theories without observers (QTWO)
Before the advent of Quantum Theory, physical theories were just about
stuff in motion. A theory would state something like “here is the kind of
stuff that exists in our universe and here is how it behaves”. For instance,
Maxwell’s theory of Electromagnetism tells us that our universe is populated
with charged particles moving around (or perhaps a continuous distribution
of charge, depending on the formulation), an electric field and a magnetic
field. That’s the stuff or ontology11. The “how it behaves” part is given nor-
mally by differential equations (Maxwell’s equations and the Lorentz force
law, in this case). That’s the dynamics of the theory12. The formulation of
the theory will not mention any observers or measurements. Observers are
just part of the stuff and a measurement is just some physical process gov-
erned by the dynamics. You can use the theory to analyse a measurement
and make experimental predictions, but the theory is not about measure-
ments and experimental predictions, but about stuff in motion.
A Quantum Theory without observers (QTWO) is a theory following the
standards explained above that replicates the experimental predictions of
the ordinary Quantum Theory of textbooks [7]. In a QTWO, you won’t
have to wonder around asking questions such as “when do I collapse the
state?” or “what counts as a measurement?”. State collapse, if present, will
follow a mathematically well-defined law given explicitly in the dynamics
of the theory, not a vague prescription involving measurements. A QTWO
will necessarily follow one of the paths (a), (b) and (c) for the solution of
the (true) measurement problem discussed in Subsection 6.2. Here are some
examples.
Bohmian Mechanics (also known as de Broglie–Bohm pilot wave theory)
is a deterministic13 QTWO in which the quantum state of the universe al-
ways evolves linearly (no collapses) and it is not informationally complete.
The theory describes the motion of actual particles, with sharply defined
trajectories, through a first order differential equation called the guiding
equation. Ordinary matter is made of these particles and the quantum state
11John S. Bell coined the name beable for this [4]. It is a pun with the word observable.
12There is actually another fundamental ingredient in the presentation of a physical
theory which is the mathematical structure of the spacetime manifold. Newtonian Me-
chanics, for instance, is normally formulated within a Galilean spacetime and Maxwell’s
Theory within a Minkowski spacetime, which is the spacetime of Special Relativity. The
spacetime structure imposes restrictions on what kinds of equations will make sense when
trying to formulate a theory.
13In its most well-known form. Some formulations of Bohmian Mechanics for
Quantum Field Theory are non deterministic. The Bohmian approach is also com-
patible with other types of ontologies that do not involve particles. This website
http://www.bohmian-mechanics.net/ contains a lot of material on Bohmian Mechanics
and also on spontaneous collapse theories.
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enters in the guiding equation, i.e., the quantum state (or wave function)
is the pilot wave that guides the particles. The motion of the particles is
highly non Newtonian and physical quantities like momentum and energy
have no meaning in the theory, though the theory does allow for the analy-
sis of “momentum measurements” and “energy measurements” and it yields
the appropriate quantum statistics for their outcomes. In fact, Bohmian
Mechanics makes exactly the same statistical predictions for experiments as
the ordinary Quantum Theory of textbooks.
The spontaneous collapse theory of Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber (GRW) is a
non deterministic QTWO in which the quantum state of the universe ran-
domly collapses from time to time, following a precisely defined stochastic
process. Between collapses, the evolution is linear. The quantum state is in-
formationally complete. Superpositions of macroscopically distinct states of
affairs in the quantum state are killed almost instantly by the spontaneous
collapses. Spontaneous collapses can also occur in a microscopic system, but
they are extremely rare. The collapse rate is proportional to the number of
particles in the system14. For single particle systems, collapses would hap-
pen about once every tens of millions of years. For a macroscopic system
of about 1024 particles, collapses would happen about once every nanosec-
ond. The experimental predictions of the theory are not identical to those
of ordinary Quantum Theory, but no experiment so far has been able to de-
tect a difference. For measurements on microscopic systems, the very rare
spontaneous collapses would make a tiny difference in the observed statis-
tics, but only if you could repeat them for tens of millions of years. More
importantly, superpositions for macroscopic systems are literally destroyed
in this theory (in nanoseconds), no matter how isolated the system is kept.
If we could perform a measurement of an operator having interference terms
with respect to some macroscopic superposition, we could test the theory
against ordinary Quantum Theory, since we would see the difference be-
tween the superposition being still there and the superposition having been
killed by a spontaneous collapse. But an experiment like that is technically
very difficult to perform.
The many-worlds interpretation of Quantum Theory is also a possible
path towards a QTWO. It would be a deterministic QTWO in which the
quantum state of the universe never collapses and it is also informationally
complete. Proponents of this approach would say that the theory is obtained
by simply considering a quantum state with a unitary linear evolution and
nothing else. There are some difficulties, though. First, it is not clear in
which sense a quantum state really describes a multitude of parallel realities.
14More precisely, the formulation of the theory does not talk about “systems”, it simply
applies to the universe as a whole. But if a subsystem of the universe is not entangled
with anything else, the spontaneous collapses happening elsewhere do not affect that
subsystem. Also, there are no particles in the theory. What I’m calling here the “number
of particles” is actually the dimension of the configuration space divided by the number
of space dimensions.
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A quantum state is a quite abstract object and without the measurement
formalism of ordinary Quantum Theory it is hard to justify any connection
of a quantum state with spacetime events15. A proposal has been made [1] to
fix this problem by using the quantum state to define a distribution of matter
in spacetime (in this approach, all the parallel realities would coexist in the
same spacetime, but would not interact with each other). What seems to me
the biggest difficulty for the many-worlds approach is to make sense of the
probabilistic predictions. If all the possible outcomes of a measurement are
going to be equally real, in which sense can we say that a certain outcome has
a certain probability of occurring? “Probabilities” in this theory seem to be
just meaningless square moduli of quantum state coefficients. Nevertheless,
let me acknowledge that the many-worlds interpretation is at least a possible
approach for a QTWO.
8. QTWOs versus Copenhagen and other “interpretations” of
Quantum Theory
It is normally said that there are many competing “interpretations of
Quantum Theory”. This is a strange terminology. What is an interpreta-
tion of a theory? Do we have also many interpretations of Newtonian Me-
chanics and of Maxwell’s Electromagnetism? What is normally presented
as “Quantum Theory”, is really a scheme for predicting outcomes of exper-
iments. What it has to say about the world are statements of the following
form: “if you prepare a state like this and does a measurement like that, you
will get the following results”. That is quite different from what I described
as being a physical theory in Section 7. A theory makes statements of the
form “here is the kind of stuff that exists in our universe and here is how it
behaves”.
Instead of looking for “interpretations of Quantum Theory”, we could
ask: what theories are compatible with the scheme for predicting outcomes
of experiments that became known as Quantum Theory? Those theories
are what we call QTWOs. One would then hope to be able to figure out
which QTWO is true. That will involve empirical tests, as some QTWOs
only agree very closely, but not exactly, with the quantum predictions. But
then some QTWOs might be empirically indistinguishable from each other.
Other criteria would have to be used, such as explanatory power and sim-
plicity. It could turn out that at some point it will be impossible to decide
between two QTWOs. But we should remember that the big enterprise of
15In fact, exactly the same objection can be raised against pure quantum state formu-
lations of GRW. That’s why I’m careful to say that the quantum state is informationally
complete, rather than just complete. In a proper formulation of GRW one has to connect
the quantum state to some sort of spacetime events and there are mainly two ways of
doing that: one is to use the quantum state to define a distribution of matter (which
yields the theory known as GRWm or GRW with matter density ontology) and the other
is to use the centers of the random quantum state collapses themselves as the spacetime
events (which yields the theory known as GRWf or GRW with flash ontology).
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Physics is far from over now and as new physics is discovered to explain new
observed phenomena, we get to see how various QTWOs manage to handle
the new physics. Some might turn out to be more adaptable than others.
Also, discussing different QTWOs might give insights on how to advance
physics. Even within the “physics that we already know” there are big open
problems whose solution could influence the choice for a QTWO. For exam-
ple, we don’t know how to make a rigorous mathematical construction for
the state space and the field operators for nontrivial interacting Quantum
Field Theories, such as Quantum Electrodynamics. Such a construction
could give us reasons to prefer one QTWO over another.
There are also so called “interpretations” of Quantum Theory that are
not QTWOs. Let us call them Copenhagen-like interpretations. The com-
petition between QTWOs and Copenhagen-like interpretations is not of the
same nature of a competition between two physical theories. It is a rather a
competition between views of what is the goal of the Physics Enterprise. The
view behind the QTWOs is that Physics is about matter in motion (or fields,
or strings or whatever it is that exists out there), about what happens in
the universe. Let us call it a realist view. The view behind the Copenhagen-
like interpretations is more anthropocentric. It is the view that Physics is
about what observers will see when they make measurements. Let us call
it an instrumentalist view. The latter view has the advantage of repeal-
ing the monster of empirical indistinguishability: in this view, empirically
equivalent theories are really the same theory, as theories are nothing but
statements of empirical predictions. On the other hand, within this anthro-
pocentric view, it would be hard to justify the use of the laws of physics
to study, say, the formation of the Solar System. There were no observers
and measurement equipment there, so in which sense can you say that a
Copenhagen-like interpretation was true back then? And then there is cos-
mology. A cosmologist studies the universe as a whole as a system. In a
Copenhagen-like scheme, in which we need outside observers making mea-
surements on the system, it is not possible to treat the entire universe as a
system.
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9. Comments on the Nature article
The article considers a thought experiment involving four experimenters
F ,W , F andW (the experiment is a generalization of the so-called Wigner’s
friend thought experiment, so W stands for “Wigner” and F for “friend”).
The friends F and F start by performing measurements on microscopic
systems involving certain microscopic superpositions (I will present a more
detailed discussion later in Subsection 9.1). These are regular experiments
that are routinely done in laboratories around the world. Here is the un-
usual part: we now model the entire macroscopic laboratories containing F
and F as isolated systems having quantum states. Since measurements on
microscopic superpositions have been performed inside them, those entire
laboratories will now be in macroscopic superpositions (a Schro¨dinger’s cat
type of situation). The experimenters W and W will now perform mea-
surements upon those laboratories and those measurements will involve op-
erators that have large interference terms with respect to the macroscopic
superpositions. This is the part that would be really difficult to accomplish
in practice. The experiments performed by W and by W have two possi-
ble outcomes each, labelled “ok” and “fail”. Using the standard quantum
mechanical rules, it is easy to check that in the given set up there is a 1
12
probability that both W and W will obtain the outcome “ok”.
Now, according to the authors, by combining statements obtained “using
the quantum mechanical rules from the point of view of the four observers”
we can show that it is really impossible for both W and W to obtain the
outcome “ok”. This is then a paradox, since if we repeat the whole exper-
iment several times, about 1
12
of those times we will get “ok” for both W
and W .
The trouble here is the authors understanding of the meaning of “using
the quantum mechanical rules from the point of view of a given observer”.
For them, “using the quantum mechanical rules from the point of view of
F” means to collapse the state of the laboratory containing F after the
measurement in that laboratory is completed. Normally, experimenters can
safely apply the collapse rule after a measurement is completed in their lab-
oratories, but that’s because they are not trying to predict the outcomes
of future experiments that will explore the interference in a superposition
of macroscopically distinct states. But here we are assuming precisely the
opposite, namely, that W is going to perform a measurement of an operator
upon F ’s laboratory that has large interference terms with respect to the
macroscopic superposition. So using the collapse rule is obviously not cor-
rect. Unless, of course, we are calculating predictions using a spontaneous
collapse theory. Then the superposition in F ’s laboratory is going to be
destroyed by a spontaneous collapse and F should take that into account,
but then so does W . There is no “difference in points of view” for these
calculations.
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If we treat the quantum state as a subjective thing that depends on
some observers knowledge, then contradictions are likely to arise by doing
calculations “from the point of view of various observers”. That is not really
surprising16. What might be puzzling for some is the following: how is it
possible, after an experimenter sees that the outcome of some experiment
is X, that he will be in a superposition between “seeing X” and “seeing
Y ”? If the outcome “X” is a known fact, doesn’t that mean that there
is no superposition? I understand that this can be a confusing matter for
a student of the ordinary quantum formalism, since that formalism is not
clear about what kinds of facts are there in a system that is being modelled
quantum mechanically. We have two options here:
(1) the quantum state is informationally complete. We are then dealing
with a many-worlds interpretation. The experimenter knows that he
is seeing X, but there is another copy of him (in another “world”)
that is seeing Y . So both copies of the experimenter know what they
are seeing and yet the superposition remains.
(2) The quantum state is not informationally complete. In this case the
quantum state is in a superposition and still there might be one single
objective fact about what the experimenter is seeing. For instance, in
Bohmian Mechanics, the experimenter is made of Bohmian particles
that have a definite configuration, no matter what the quantum state
is. This configuration determines what the experimenter is seeing.
Here are some final thoughts on the idea that “using a physical theory
from the point of view of a given observer” is a meaningful thing. First,
let me mention the one situation in which “points of view” actually play
a role. That is the situation in which an agent does not have perfect in-
formation about a system and the agent wants to make predictions using
subjective probabilities. For instance, I assign some subjective probabilities
to initial conditions of a system that are well-determined but unknown to
me. Then, I use the dynamics of the theory to calculate the probability
for some outcome. That probability will again be a subjective probability.
Other agents that know more than me might get different conclusions. That
16Here is a very simple way to obtain a “paradox” by treating quantum states subjec-
tively. Experimenter F picks a microscopic system in a superposition 1√
2
(ψ1 + ψ2), with
{ψ1, ψ2} some orthonormal basis. He then performs a measurement with respect to that
basis and gets himself and his entire laboratory into a superposition 1√
2
(ψ1⊗θ1+ψ2⊗θ2),
with θj denoting the quantum state corresponding to the outcome associated to the
basis element ψj having been recorded by the experimental equipment and the ex-
perimenter F . Now W does a measurement with respect to the orthonormal basis{
1√
2
(ψ1⊗ θ1+ψ2⊗ θ2),
1√
2
(ψ1⊗ θ1−ψ2⊗ θ2)
}
. We have that W will obtain the outcome
corresponding to the first basis element with certainty. Now, “reasoning from F ’s point of
view”, i.e., collapsing the state of his laboratory to either ψ1 ⊗ θ1 or ψ2⊗ θ2, we conclude
that W obtains the outcome corresponding to the first basis element with probability 1
2
.
Repeating the experiment a large number n of times, we will then obtain an outcome that
has the tiny probability 1
2n
of occurring by “reasoning from F ’s point of view”.
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is not a contradiction. But quantum states are not like subjective probabil-
ities, a quantum superposition — like in the double slit experiment — is an
objective thing that generate objective interference patterns.
Sadly, I suppose that many physicists would indeed subscribe to the wrong
idea that the application of a physical theory involves “points of view” and
that is likely because many presentations of basic physics are not doing a
good job at clarifying certain distinctions17. Physics books normally write
down the equations for a theory in terms of coordinate systems (t, x, y, z) in
the spacetime manifold. We then have to check that the dynamics defined
by those equations is independent of the choice of the coordinate system, so
that the theory is well-defined. One could also formulate those equations
using modern coordinate-free mathematical language, so no independence of
coordinate system has to be checked. But this is not the standard practice in
most physics books. There is nothing wrong with using coordinates systems,
as long as you understand that a coordinate system is not the same thing
as an observer. Of course, it is true that an observer making measurements
will often measure the values t, x, y, z of the coordinates of a point of the
spacetime manifold (normally called an event). Observers and coordinate
systems are thus related concepts, but not the same thing. “Observer”
is a vague anthropocentric notion, while the concept of coordinate system
involves only sharp mathematics. The abundant use of coordinate systems
and the sloppy language that confuses coordinate systems with observers
creates the impression that we are “applying the theory from various points
of view”.
9.1. A more detailed analysis of the Frauchiger & Renner paper.
In what follows, we denote by H the Hilbert space containing the quan-
tum states for F ’s laboratory and by H the Hilbert space containing the
quantum states for F ’s laboratory. Quantum states for the composite sys-
tem consisting of both laboratories are then elements of the tensor product
H⊗H (I have briefly explained how to handle composite systems in Quan-
tum Theory in footnote 8). Each laboratory will be further decomposed
into a microscopic subsystem and a macroscopic subsystem containing the
experimental apparatus and the experimenter; so, elements of H and H will
also be written as tensor products corresponding to such decomposition of
each laboratory into subsystems.
Experimenter F starts by taking a microscopic system in a quantum state
1√
3
ψh +
√
2√
3
ψt, with {ψh, ψt} an orthonormal basis of the Hilbert space con-
taining the quantum states for that microscopic system. The experimenter
then performs a measurement with respect to the basis {ψh, ψt} and records
the outcome. We call heads the outcome corresponding to the basis ele-
ment ψh and tails the outcome corresponding to the basis element ψt. We
17Here is a rare example [10] of a good book with a clear presentation of basic physics
and spacetime theories. It is highly recommended if you are confused by the standard way
of presenting things in physics books.
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then denote by θh and θt the quantum states for the macroscopic system
containing the experimental apparatus and the experimenter F himself cor-
responding respectively to the outcomes “heads” and “tails” having been
recorded. Setting
φh = ψh ⊗ θh ∈ H and φt = ψt ⊗ θt ∈ H,
we obtain from linearity of time evolution that F ’s laboratory ends up in
the quantum state18:
(5)
1√
3
φh +
√
2√
3
φt ∈ H.
Experimenter F now prepares a new microscopic system and sends it to
F ’s laboratory. The preparation procedure for the new microscopic system
will be dependent on whether F has seen “heads” or “tails”, in the form that
we now explain. Denote by {ψu, ψd} an orthonormal basis for the Hilbert
space containing the quantum states for this new microscopic system. If
F saw “heads”, the new microscopic system is prepared in the state ψd
and if F saw “tails”, the new microscopic system is prepared in the state
1√
2
(ψu + ψd). Experimenter F now does a measurement with respect to
the basis {ψu, ψd} and records the outcome; we call up the outcome corre-
sponding to the basis vector ψu and down the outcome corresponding to the
basis vector ψd. Accordingly, we denote by θu and θd the quantum states
for the macroscopic system containing the experimental apparatus and the
experimenter F himself corresponding respectively to the outcomes “up”
and “down” having been recorded. We set:
φu = ψu ⊗ θu ∈ H and φd = ψd ⊗ θd ∈ H.
The dynamics of these experiments is thus designed so that if F ’s laboratory
were in the quantum state φh, then the composite system consisting of both
laboratories would end up in the quantum state φh⊗φd and if F ’s laboratory
were in the quantum state φt, then the composite system would end up in the
quantum state 1√
2
(
φt⊗(φu+φd)
)
. Since the quantum state of F ’s laboratory
was (5), by linearity of time evolution we obtain that the quantum state of
the composite system will end up as:
(6)
Ψ =
1√
3
(φh ⊗ φd) +
√
2√
3
1√
2
(
φt ⊗ (φu + φd)
)
=
1√
3
(φh ⊗ φd + φt ⊗ φu + φt ⊗ φd) ∈ H ⊗H.
In what follows, only the two-dimensional subspaces of H and H spanned
respectively by {φh, φt} and {φu, φd} will be relevant, so we will simply
replace H and H with those subspaces.
18In this subsection, we are assuming that we are not dealing with a spontaneous
collapse theory.
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In the next part of the experiment, W does a measurement upon F ’s
laboratory with respect to the orthonormal basis
φo¯ =
1√
2
(φh − φt), φf¯ =
1√
2
(φh + φt)
of H and the corresponding outcomes are denoted by ok and fail, respec-
tively. Finally, W does a measurement upon F ’s laboratory with respect to
the orthonormal basis
φo =
1√
2
(φd − φu), φf = 1√
2
(φd + φu)
of H and the corresponding outcomes are also denoted by ok and fail, re-
spectively19.
To compute the probabilities for the four possible pairs of outcomes for
the experiments done by W and W , we rewrite the state Ψ as a linear
combination of the orthonormal basis {φo¯⊗φo, φo¯⊗φf , φf¯ ⊗φo, φf¯ ⊗φf} of
H⊗H. A straightforward calculation yields:
Ψ =
1
2
√
3
(φo¯ ⊗ φo − φo¯ ⊗ φf + φf¯ ⊗ φo + 3φf¯ ⊗ φf ).
The probability that both W and W obtain the outcome “ok” is then
∣∣∣
1
2
√
3
∣∣∣
2
=
1
12
.
This is the correct probability predicted by Quantum Theory for the exper-
iment.
Now let us review the incorrect reasoning that leads to the conclusion that
it is impossible for both W and W to get the outcome “ok”. This reasoning
in based on the following statements:
(a) analysing the experiment “from F ’s point of view”, we obtain that
if F gets the outcome “tails”, then W will get the outcome “fail”;
(b) analysing the experiment “from F ’s point of view”, we obtain that
if F gets the outcome “up”, then F got the outcome “tails”;
(c) analysing the experiment “from W ’s point of view”, we obtain that
if W gets the outcome “ok”, then F got the outcome “up”.
Combining (a), (b) and (c), we conclude that if W gets the outcome “ok”,
then W will get the outcome “fail”. Now let us discuss statements (a), (b)
and (c) individually.
19Actually, since F ’s and F ’s laboratories are entangled, it would be better to describe
W ’s measurement as a measurement upon the composite system with respect to the
orthogonal direct sum decomposition H ⊗ H = (φo¯ ⊗ H) ⊕ (φf¯ ⊗ H). Similarly, W ’s
measurement is a measurement with respect to the orthogonal direct sum decomposition
H⊗H = (H⊗φo)⊕ (H⊗φf ). For calculational purposes, we can treat the measurements
of bothW andW simultaneously as a single measurement with respect to the orthonormal
basis {φo¯ ⊗ φo, φo¯ ⊗ φf , φf¯ ⊗ φo, φf¯ ⊗ φf} of H⊗H.
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Discussion of statement (a). Statement (a) is supposed to be justified as
follows: if F obtained “tails” and if we collapse the quantum state right after
F ’s experiment, then the quantum state of the composite system ends up
being φt⊗ φf , instead of the superposition Ψ = 1√3 (φh ⊗ φd) +
√
2√
3
(φt ⊗ φf ).
Now assuming that the quantum state of the composite system is φt ⊗ φf ,
we conclude correctly thatW will obtain the outcome “fail”. What is wrong
with this reasoning is that there is no justification for collapsing the quan-
tum state after F ’s experiment, as W is going to perform a measurement
of an operator having large interference terms with respect to the given
macroscopic superposition of φh ⊗ φd and φt ⊗ φf . The experimenter F
is not “using Quantum Theory from his point of view”, he is really using
Quantum Theory incorrectly. Due to interference, we are forced to treat F ’s
laboratory as a system with a quantum state until W ’s experiment is over.
Since Quantum Theory is vague about what is real in a system modeled
through a quantum state, we then can’t discuss within the standard quan-
tum formalism the actual outcome obtained by F . It is then not possible to
calculate the conditional probability
(7) P (E |F obtained the outcome “tails”)
for an event E that is going to be obtained only after W ’s experiment is
concluded. One possibility is that the quantum state is informationally
complete, so that we are dealing with a many-worlds theory. In that case, the
conditional probability (7) is meaningless because there is really no matter
of fact about what outcome F obtained20. The other possibility is that
the quantum state is not informationally complete and that there is a fact
about F ’s outcome, so that the conditional probability (7) is meaningful. Its
calculation, however, will depend on the details of the dynamics of the extra
variables that supplement the description given by the quantum state. Note
that the conditional probability (7) also cannot be determined empirically.
Namely, in order to maintain the superposition, F ’s laboratory has to be
kept isolated untilW ’s experiment is completed. After the entire experiment
is concluded, F could tell us what he saw, but his testimony cannot be
trusted. The weird supercomplex experiment performed by W might easily
have changed all the macroscopic facts inside F ’s laboratory, including F ’s
brain and memories.
Discussion of statement (b). Right after F ’s experiment, the quantum
state of the composite system containing both laboratories is Ψ (recall (6)).
If this quantum state is informationally complete, then we are dealing with
a many-worlds theory and the state Ψ is understood as describing three
“parallel worlds”. There is no world in which F obtained the outcome
“heads” and F obtained the outcome “up”. So the conditional statement
20Also, due to interference, it is not possible to identify a world that came into exis-
tence after W ’s experiment as a continuation of a specific world that existed before W ’s
experiment.
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appearing in (b) can be understood as a correct statement, if we interpret it
as a statement that must hold separately in each world. If the quantum state
is not informationally complete and if the experiments performed by F and
F have single outcomes, then we can calculate the probabilities for these
outcomes by considering a measurement with respect to the orthonormal
basis21
(8) {φh ⊗ φu, φh ⊗ φd, φt ⊗ φu, φt ⊗ φd}.
The probability for the outcome corresponding to the basis element φh⊗φu
is zero, so we conclude that it is not possible for F to obtain the outcome
“heads” and for F to obtain the outcome “up”, i.e., the conditional state-
ment in (b) holds.
We note that the experiments performed by the friends F and F are very
ordinary laboratory experiments and that any textbook on Quantum Theory
would have handled them by simply applying the collapse rule after F ’s
measurement and by treating the macroscopic experimental equipment and
the experimenters themselves in terms of classical physics, without quantum
states. One would then establish (b) by arguing simply that if F obtained
the outcome “heads”, then he sent a microscopic system to F ’s laboratory
in the state ψd, which ensures the outcome “down” in the measurement with
respect to the basis {ψu, ψd}. We chose to be extra careful in our analysis,
but using the collapse rule here would have been fine, as an operator having
(8) as a basis of eigenvectors has no interference terms with respect to the
superposition of φh ⊗ φd with φt ⊗ (φu + φd).
Discussion of statement (c). This is very similar to the discussion of state-
ment (b), so we only summarize the main facts. The relevant mathematical
fact is that Ψ is orthogonal to φo¯⊗φd, so if we write Ψ as a linear combination
of the orthonormal basis
{φo¯ ⊗ φu, φo¯ ⊗ φd, φf¯ ⊗ φu, φf¯ ⊗ φd}
then the coefficient for φo¯ ⊗ φd is zero. We can analyse W ’s experiment
using the quantum formalism, obtaining a post experiment state Θ for the
system consisting ofW ’s laboratory, F ’s laboratory and F ’s laboratory. The
quantum state Θ will be a linear combination of the orthonormal set
(9) {θo¯ ⊗ φo¯ ⊗ φu, θo¯ ⊗ φo¯ ⊗ φd, θf¯ ⊗ φf¯ ⊗ φu, θf¯ ⊗ φf¯ ⊗ φd},
21Notice that this measurement is not going to be performed in the actual experimental
set up. Inserting it there would destroy the relevant macroscopic superposition and mess
up with the outcomes that would later be obtained by W and W . Nevertheless, we can
use the quantum formalism for this measurement in order to calculate the probabilities
for the outcomes of the experiments performed by F and F . Indeed, we are assuming now
an underlying theory that assigns well-defined outcomes for those experiments and that
the probabilities for those outcomes are compatible with the quantum predictions. To be
completely precise, we have to assume also that there is no possibility of retrocausation,
i.e., that inserting this new measurement right after F ’s experiment doesn’t mess up with
what happened in the past of this new measurement.
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with θo¯ and θf¯ denoting the quantum states forW ’s experimental equipment
corresponding respectively to the outcomes “ok” and “fail” being recorded.
The fact that the basic state φo¯⊗ φd does not appear in the expansion of Ψ
implies that the basic state θo¯⊗φo¯⊗φd does not appear in the expansion of
Θ. If the quantum state Θ is informationally complete, then we are dealing
with a many-worlds theory and there is no world in which W obtains the
outcome “ok” and F obtains the outcome “down”. This means that the
conditional statement in (c) holds in each world.
If the quantum state Θ is not informationally complete and if the rele-
vant experiments have single outcomes, then we use the quantum formalism
for a measurement with respect to an orthonormal basis containing (9) to
calculate the probabilities for those outcomes. We then conclude that it is
impossible for W to obtain the outcome “ok” if F obtained22 the outcome
“down”, i.e., the conditional statement in (c) holds.
Notice that it is crucial here that W does his experiment before W , oth-
erwise we would have run into the same problems discussed in our analysis
of statement (a). Namely, if we reverse the order of W ’s and W ’s experi-
ments, it will not be possible to use the quantum formalism to calculate the
probabilities for W ’s outcome conditioned on the outcome obtained by F
before W ’s experiment.
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